Fault Lines: Terror in Northern Nigeria and the Fight for West Africa’s Center
Terror in Northern Nigeria isn’t a northern problem. It’s a West African one, and the region is running out of time to treat it that way.
On the evening of March 16, 2026, three suicide bombers walked into Maiduguri as the city broke its Ramadan fast. The explosions tore through crowded areas of the Borno State capital, killing and injuring civilians and once again reminding Nigerians that the country’s insurgency remains capable of striking even after years of military operations and territorial campaigns.
The attack was more than another violent incident in a city that has become synonymous with the Boko Haram insurgency. It exposed the deeper problem facing northern Nigeria: the conflict has evolved beyond a single insurgent organisation, a single battlefield or a single explanation. Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru, bandit networks and other armed groups operate within an increasingly complicated security environment in which ideological insurgency, criminality, local grievances and weak governance overlap.
The March attack also came at a time when the wider Lake Chad Basin continues to experience the consequences of years of conflict. Millions of people across northeastern Nigeria and neighbouring parts of Niger, Chad and Cameroon have been affected by displacement, destroyed livelihoods, food insecurity and the disruption of basic services. The humanitarian consequences have outlived individual military operations, creating conditions in which insecurity can reproduce itself.
The conflict in northern Nigeria has never been one war. It has been a collection of conflicts feeding into one another. Boko Haram’s original insurgency has fragmented, with ISWAP emerging as a powerful rival and other factions maintaining their own networks. In other areas, bandit groups have developed around kidnapping, cattle rustling, extortion and control of rural territory. The boundaries between ideological violence and criminal enterprise are increasingly difficult to draw.
This matters because a military response designed for one type of enemy cannot automatically resolve every form of insecurity. An insurgent group motivated by ideology, a criminal kidnapping network and a community caught in a farmer-herder conflict may require completely different responses. Treating all of them as the same security problem risks producing operations that may suppress violence temporarily without addressing the conditions that allow it to return.
The Middle Belt represents another fault line. States such as Benue, Plateau, Niger and parts of Kaduna have experienced recurring violence linked to land disputes, farmer-herder tensions, communal grievances, environmental pressures and the activities of armed groups. What makes this particularly dangerous is the possibility of different conflicts converging. Where insecurity already exists, criminal groups can exploit communal tensions, while communities can become increasingly distrustful of government security institutions.
The consequences are not confined to the North. Southern Nigeria is already paying the economic price of insecurity in the form of higher food prices, disrupted agricultural production, kidnapping risks, increased transport costs and pressure on public finances. When farmers cannot safely cultivate their land, when traders cannot move goods freely and when rural communities are emptied by violence, the effects eventually reach major cities and households far from the original conflict zones.
Nigeria’s borders also do not correspond to the borders of the armed groups operating within its territory. The Lake Chad Basin has always been transnational, while the wider Sahel has experienced the expansion and transformation of jihadist networks. Developments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger therefore matter to Nigeria, just as instability in northern Nigeria can affect neighbouring countries. The expansion of militant activity towards coastal West Africa has made the security situation even more urgent for the region.
This is where the ECOWAS problem becomes important. The political fractures created by military coups and the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the regional bloc have complicated West Africa’s ability to maintain a coordinated security response. Whatever the political disagreements between member states and the countries that have left, armed groups do not recognise those diplomatic divisions. Militants move through spaces created by weak border coordination, limited intelligence sharing and fragile state presence.
Nigeria’s position within this changing regional environment is particularly important. As the largest country and one of the region’s most influential political and economic powers, Nigeria carries enormous responsibility for regional stability. But that responsibility cannot be met by military power alone. It requires intelligence cooperation, border management, economic investment, functioning local institutions and a credible regional security architecture.
Washington’s growing interest in African security also deserves attention. The United States has continued to engage African governments on counterterrorism, intelligence and security cooperation, while the changing security environment across the Sahel has forced Western powers to reconsider how they operate in the region. Airpower and intelligence capabilities can provide important advantages, but they cannot substitute for the presence of legitimate and functioning government institutions on the ground.
The harder diagnosis is therefore one of governance. Military forces can clear territory, but another institution must hold it and a functioning government must govern it. Communities need security, justice, schools, healthcare, roads, markets and economic opportunities. Without those foundations, military victories can become temporary pauses in a much longer conflict.
Nigeria also needs to confront the political and economic conditions that allow insecurity to spread. The response cannot be reduced to deploying more soldiers or acquiring more weapons. Security reform must be accompanied by stronger intelligence systems, better policing, improved border management, effective local government and policies that address the underlying pressures driving conflict across different parts of the country.
The Middle Belt requires particular attention because it sits at the intersection of several national fault lines. Questions of land, identity, religion, migration, agriculture and political representation have repeatedly produced tension. A serious national security strategy must therefore address these issues without reducing complex local conflicts to simplistic ethnic or religious explanations.
The fight for West Africa’s centre is ultimately a fight over whether the region can prevent its separate crises from becoming one interconnected security emergency. Northern Nigeria, the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel cannot be treated as isolated theatres. Their problems increasingly overlap through migration, trade, arms trafficking, organised crime, extremist networks and economic disruption.
Nigeria remains central to that struggle. But being central also means recognising that the country’s security challenges cannot be solved entirely within its own borders. The region requires sustained cooperation between governments, security institutions, communities and international partners. It also requires political leaders to recognise that security is not simply about defeating armed groups. It is about building a state capable of preventing communities from becoming vulnerable to them in the first place.
Northern Nigeria is not someone else’s problem. It is Nigeria’s problem. Nigeria’s problem is increasingly West Africa’s problem. And West Africa may not have much time left to decide how seriously it intends to treat it.
About the Writer
Oladimeji Bolarinwa is the President of Think Yoruba First (TYF) and Co-Director of the Think Yorùbá First Political Action Committee (TYFPAC). He is a writer, political commentator and public affairs analyst whose work focuses on geopolitics, political strategy, identity, governance, regional interests and Nigeria’s position within Africa and the wider international system.
As President of Think Yoruba First, Bolarinwa is involved in advocacy around Yoruba political and economic interests, cultural preservation, regional development, political participation, true federalism and security reform. His public work examines the relationship between ethnicity, political power, demography, governance and national development, with particular attention to issues affecting Yorùbáland and Nigeria’s wider political landscape.
Bolarinwa also writes on international affairs and geopolitical developments, examining how historical forces, regional alliances, political movements and shifting centres of power shape contemporary Africa and the global system. His analysis frequently connects Nigeria’s domestic political questions with wider developments across West Africa and beyond.
He is a columnist with The Yoruba Times, where he writes “Geopolitics with Oladimeji Bolarinwa,” a column examining major geopolitical developments, historical forces, regional power struggles and political questions shaping Nigeria, Africa and the wider world.